Designing Fees for Music Copyright Holders in Radio Services
Roberto Bombana and
Carla Marchese ()
POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
This paper investigates which is the most desirable payment schedule, from a social welfare standpoint, for compensating IPR holders for music broadcast by radio stations. A model of a radio station that acts as a monopoly with respect to listeners and sells ads in a competitive market is presented. Two types of fees, ad valorem and per unit, are examined. Exploiting the similarity between taxes and fees, we extend results from taxation theory in two-sided markets to show that the case where only one side (i.e. advertisers) pays, while the other (the listeners) receives the service for free, diÂ¤ers somewhat from the case thus far considered by the literature, in which both sides pay. The results mildly support the prevailing regulatory approach, based on ad valorem fees.
Keywords: regulation; radio; collecting agencies; IPR fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H44 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cul
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Journal Article: Designing fees for music copyright holders in radio services (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:166
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