A simulative frame to study the integration of defectors in a cooperative setting
Marie-Edith Bissey () and
Guido Ortona ()
POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
The paper presents the results of some simulations of the effect of the invasion of non-cooperating subjects into a community adopting a cooperative convention. The convention is described by an indefinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game. We check the effects on the robustness of the cooperating convention of two characteristics of the game, namely the number of cooperators and the "intelligence" of the players. The relevance for real-world problems is discussed. The simulation program, written in SWARM, is highly flexible, and allows for the consideration of quite a lot of features.
Keywords: cooperation; conventions; prisoner's dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C7 C88 D74 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14KXsMhfDCOiDxairu ... hTz/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:24
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucia Padovani ().