A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well
Guido Ortona ()
POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
The paper describes a weighted-voting system for the election of a Parliament. The system is easy to implement, and it dominates plurality, where "dominates" means that it performs better with reference to both representativeness and stability. The system has some other nice properties,namely (a) it offers an easy-to-read evaluation of the loss of representativeness of an electoral system; and (b) it makes it relatively easy to adopt the best system after the vote, i.e. the best system conditional to the choice of electors. Indicators for representativeness and stability are defined. Results are experimental.
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oil1KwGvh_Vh_DUUZ ... IpU/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:4
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucia Padovani ().