Transfers and Altruistic Punishments in Third Party Punishment Game Experiments

Stefania Ottone

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: Our research is a variant of the third party punishment game. In particular, we want to test whether players have heterogeneous preferences; the levels of the sanction and of the transfer are proportional to the unfairness of the Dictator; the change of the role influences the Observer's reaction to unfair behavior; players' decision to punish the Dictator and/or to help the Receiver depends on how costly their intervention is.

JEL-codes: A12 A13 C72 C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_-XUYG1uD2LROLZJ1 ... 6lG/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:41

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucia Padovani ().