Simulating voting rule reforms for the Italian parliament. An economic perspective
Stefania Ottone (),
Ferruccio Ponzano () and
Roberto Ricciuti ()
POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the electoral rules in Italy. In particular, we simulate some voting rules to test what is the best electoral system on the basis of a utility function that takes into account two indices: representativeness and governability. As long as governability is important, a mixed member system (75% plurality, 25% proportional representation) outperforms the others. Our tool is the software ALEX4.1.
Keywords: Italian Parliament; electoral system; simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C88 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cmp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p3wqoJd7AFaD5ai4U ... xYb/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Simulating Voting Rule Reforms for the Italian Parliament: An Economic Perspective (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:88
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucia Padovani ().