Country Funds and Asymmetric Information
Jeffrey A. Frankel and Sergio L. Schmukler.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sergio Schmukler () and
Jeffrey Alexander Frankel ()
No C97-087, Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley
Closed-end country funds trade in New York at their price. Their Net Asset Value (NAV) represent the value of the underlying assets, usually traded in each particular country. If the holders of the underlying assets have more information the about loc al assets than the country fund holders, changes in NAVs will tend to explain future changes in prices but not vice versa. This paper shows that most NAVs appear exogenous; while most prices reject exogeneity. Past changes in NAVs and discounts predict cu rrent prices more frequently than prices and discounts predict NAVs. The price (NAV) adjustment coefficients are low and negatively correlated with the local (foreign) market variability--but not with the fund price (NAV) variability. These findings are c onsistent with the existence of asymmetric information in international capital markets. The appendix introduces a model of asymmetric information, that rationalizes our empirical findings. Different perceived risk makes foreign investors willing to less pay for local assets than domestic investors. Therefore, country fund prices (driven mainly by small U.S. investors) tend to be lower than NAVs (driven mainly by domestic and large foreign investors). Two other propositions are derived. First, since NAVs and prices are linked by a long-run relationship, unusually large past discounts explain current NAVs and prices. Second, the presence of "noise traders" delays the adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium.
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Journal Article: Country Funds and Asymmetric Information (2000)
Working Paper: Country funds and asymmetric information (1998)
Working Paper: Country Funds and Asymmetric Information (1998)
Working Paper: Country Funds and Asymmetric Information (1997)
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