Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency

Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benjamin Hermalin

No 90-140, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Date: 1990-04-01
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Working Paper: Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency (1990)
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