Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency

Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: contract law; asymmetric information; protecting debtors; Law; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

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Working Paper: Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency (1990)
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