Estimating the shirking model with variable effort

Eric Strobl () and Frank Walsh

Open Access publications from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: We show in a theoretical efficiency wage model where firms differ in monitoring intensity that the impact of monitoring intensity on wages is ambiguous, a result that mirrors evidence from the empirical literature. We argue that to correctly specify the impact of monitoring on wages, the interaction between monitoring and effort needs to be modelled. Results using a worker, firm panel from Ghana which contains reasonable effort and monitoring proxies show that the return to effort is higher in poorly monitored sectors as the theory suggests.

Keywords: Efficiency wages; Effort; Monitoring intensity; Efficiency wages; Supervision; Size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2007-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in: Labour Economics, 14(3) 2007-06

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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8056 Open Access version, 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Estimating the shirking model with variable effort (2007)
Working Paper: Estimating the shirking model with variable effort (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:oapubs:10197/8056

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