Efficiency wages and bargaining

Frank Walsh

No 200523, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: I argue that in contrast to the literature to date efficiency wage and bargaining solutions will typically be independent. If the bargained wage satisfies the efficiency wage constraint efficiency wages are irrelevant. If it does not, typically we have the efficiency wage solution and bargaining is irrelevant.

Keywords: Wage bargaining; Efficiency wage theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11
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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/192 First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Efficiency wages and bargaining (2012)
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