TENANCY RENT CONTROL AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN MAINTENANCE
Richard Arnott and
Elizaveta Shevyakhova
Additional contact information
Elizaveta Shevyakhova: Department of Economics, Boston College
No 200812, Working Papers from University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality and maintenance. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to "show" it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.
Keywords: tenancy rent control; rent control; maintenance; housing quality; credible commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R21 R31 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2008-09, Revised 2008-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers08/08-12.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance (2014) 
Working Paper: Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance (2014) 
Working Paper: Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance (2007) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucr:wpaper:200812
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kelvin Mac ().