On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games

Elvio Accinelli and Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera ()
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Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera: Department of Economics at the University of Siena.

No 1010, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy ESS for asymmetric two-population games of finite size in its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a defnition of ESS for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. Then, we show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (NE) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) NE of the symmetric version game. So, we study (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and define corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game.

Keywords: Asymmetric game; Evolutionary games; ESS; Replicator dynamics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:1010

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