Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

No 1300, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out| surprisingly|to be a very restrictive class of games.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2000-12
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/1924 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities (2004)
Working Paper: Extensive Form Games and Strategic Complementarities (2000)
Working Paper: Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:1300

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