Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

Federico Echenique

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: (less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out---surprisingly---to be a very restrictive class of games.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities (2004)
Working Paper: Extensive Form Games and Strategic Complementarities (2000)
Working Paper: Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004005

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