Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access?

R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay and Guido Sandleris
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: R. Gaston Gelos (), Guido Sandleris and Ratna Sahay

Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Abstract: What determines the ability of governments from developing countries to access international credit markets? We examine this question using detailed data on sovereign bond issuances and public syndicated bank loans between 1980 and 2000. A key finding of this paper is that the frequency of default does not reduce market access and there appears to be no lengthy exclusion from credit markets following a default. We also find that trade openness, a standard measure of a country's links with the rest of the world, and traditional liquidity and macroeconomic indicators do not help much in explaining market access. However, a country's vulnerability to shocks and the perceived quality of economic policies and institutions appear to influence the government’s ability to tap the markets.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access? (2011)
Working Paper: Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:2008-02

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