Do People Make Strategic Commitments? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance

Anders Poulsen () and Michael Roos ()

No 7, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.

Keywords: Strategic commitment; commitment; bargaining; strategic value of information; physical timing effects; endogenous timing; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 J6 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance (2010)
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