EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games

Sandro Casal, Francesco Fallucchi () and Simone Quercia

No 16-05R, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We experimentally investigate the role of responders' moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experiment, proposers can increase their share of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. We find that responders are not willing to engage in 'immoral' transactions only when fully informed about proposers' behavior toward the NGO. Under complete information, their willingness to reject offers increases with the strength of the harm to the NGO. Moreover, the possibility to nullify the effects of the negative externality through rejection further increases their willingness to reject. We show that the latter result is better explained by a model of consequentialist moral concerns toward the NGO rather than deontological morality about own actions.

Keywords: three-player ultimatum game; moral reasoning; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
Date: 2017-05-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/166500/14307614/16- ... fc-b8ec-4da245228548 main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:wcbess:16-05r

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Reception, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Cushan ().

 
Page updated 2019-08-11
Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:16-05r