Does strategy fairness make inequality more acceptable?

Mengjie Wang
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Mengjie Wang: University of East Anglia

No 17-08, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper proposes a new concept of fairness: strategy fairness. The conjecture is that inequalities will tend to be seen as acceptable if they come about through the workings of fair rules, even though they are the result of self-interested intentions. A model of strategy fairness is provided to show how the concept of strategy fairness can be incorporated into a more complete model. The concept of strategy fairness is tested using an experiment. It turns out that subjects are more willing to accept inequalities that are the result of fair procedures. The surprising result emerges that procedural unfairness makes both disadvantaged and advantaged players more likely to take.

Keywords: procedural fairness; inequality; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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