EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Compound Games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests

Stefan Penczynski, Stefania Sitzia and Jiwei Zheng
Additional contact information
Stefan Penczynski: School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
Stefania Sitzia: School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
Jiwei Zheng: Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster (UK)

No 20-04, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This study introduces the concept of “compound games†and investigates whether the decomposition of a game – when implemented – influences behaviour. For example, we investigate whether separating battle of the sexes games into a pure coordination component and the remaining battle of the sexes component changes coordination success. The literature attributes high coordination rates in pure coordination games with focal points to team reasoning and low coordination rates in related battle of the sexes games to level-k reasoning. We ï¬ nd that coordination success in compound games depends on the decomposition and order of component games.

Keywords: Compound games; focal points; framing; collective interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/cbess/UEA-CBESS-20-04.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:wcbess:20-04

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Reception, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Cushan ().

 
Page updated 2021-10-12
Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:20-04