Decomposed games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests

Stefan Penczynski, Stefania Sitzia and Jiwei Zheng
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Stefan Penczynski: School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
Stefania Sitzia: School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
Jiwei Zheng: Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster (UK)

No 20-04, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: The literature attributes high coordination rates in pure coordination games with focal points to team reasoning and low coordination rates in related battle of the sexes games to level k reasoning. We investigate whether coordination success changes in these games when they are decomposed in two component games. Among others, we decompose a pure coordination game into two battle of the sexes components and a battle of the sexes game in one pure coordination component and one battle of the sexes component. In line with narrow bracketing, we observe that the game decompositions are behaviourally relevant. We find that coordination success increases and decreases depending on the type of decomposition and order of component games.

Keywords: Decomposed games; focal points; narrow bracketing; framing; collective interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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