Strategic Thinking in Jury Decisions: An Experimental Study

Can Celebi and Stefan Penczynski
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Can Celebi: University of Mannheim
Stefan Penczynski: School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia

No 23-01, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: Theoretical work by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) has shown how strategic voting undermines the intuition that unanimous voting eliminates convictions of innocent defendants. We set up a level-k model of jury voting and experimentally investigate strategic thinking with an experimental design that uses intra-team communication. Looking at juries using the unanimity rule, we show that the jury performance depends on the strategic sophistication of jury members, which in turn depends on the complexity of the task at hand.

Keywords: Jury voting; levels of reasoning; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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