Information Transmission and Preference Similarity

Andreas Blume

Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1997)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1997)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1997)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1996)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uia:iowaec:96-04

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