Information Transmission and Preference Similarity

Andreas Blume

Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes as a solution concept for games sets of Nash equilibria that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. We prove existence, examine some variants that are related to evolutionary solution concepts, and, most importantly, offer a unified approach to predicting outcomes in sender-receiver games with imperfect incentive alignment. We strenghten predictions under partial common interest conditions as well as reject uninformative equilibria in Crawford and Sobel's parametric model of preference similarity.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1997)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1997)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1996)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1996)
Working Paper: Information Transmission and Preference Similarity (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-11

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