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An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy

Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee for it to be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task.

Date: 1998-09
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Journal Article: An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games (1998) Downloads
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