Properties of scoring auctions

John Asker and Estelle Cantillon

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds.

Date: 2008
Note: FLWIN
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (139)

Published in: The Rand journal of economics (2008) v.39 n° 1,p.69-85

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Related works:
Journal Article: Properties of scoring auctions (2008)
Working Paper: Properties of Scoring Auctions (2006)
Working Paper: Properties of Scoring Auctions (2004)
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