Properties of Scoring Auctions

Estelle Cantillon and John Asker

No 4734, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour in scoring auctions when suppliers? private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behaviour and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.

Keywords: Procurement; Multi-attribute; Multidimensional private information; Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L14 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Properties of scoring auctions (2008)
Working Paper: Properties of scoring auctions (2008)
Working Paper: Properties of Scoring Auctions (2006)
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