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Judicial Independence and Party Politics in Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal

Sofia Amaral-Garcia, Nuno Garoupa () and Veronica Grembi

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: In this article we test to what extent Kelsenian‐type constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying the Portuguese constitutional court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.

Date: 2009
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Published in: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (2009) v.6 n° 2,p.381–404

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Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/301515