Choosing an Electoral Rule: Values and Self-Interest in the Lab

Damien Bol, André Blais, Maxime Coulombe, Jean-François Laslier and Jean-Benoît Pilet

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules.

Keywords: lab experiment; choice of decision rules; electoral rules; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in: Journal of economic psychology (2023),p.102602

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Related works:
Journal Article: Choosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab (2023)
Working Paper: Choosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab (2023)
Working Paper: Choosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab (2023)
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