Debunking Rumors in Networks

Luca Merlino, Paolo Pin and Nicole Tabasso

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals’ incentives to verify. (JEL D83, D85, L82, Z13)

Date: 2023-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-net
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Published in: American Economic Journal. Microeconomics (2023) v.15 n° 1,p.467-496

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Related works:
Journal Article: Debunking Rumors in Networks (2023)
Working Paper: Debunking Rumors in Networks (2022)
Working Paper: Debunking Rumors in Networks (2022)
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