Debunking Rumors in Networks

Luca Merlino, Paolo Pin and Nicole Tabasso

No 2019: 29, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: We study the diffusion of a true and a false opinion (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing an opinion, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Online social communication exacerbates relative rumor prevalence as long as it increases homophily or verification costs. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals' incentives to verify.

Keywords: Social Networks; Rumors; Verification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2019, Revised 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-net, nep-pay, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.unive.it/web/fileadmin/user_upload/dip ... no_tabasso_29_19.pdf First version, anno (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Debunking Rumors in Networks (2023)
Working Paper: Debunking Rumors in Networks (2023)
Working Paper: Debunking Rumors in Networks (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2019:29

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sassano Sonia ().