Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking

Jenny Monheim and Marie Obidzinski
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jenny Monheim Helstroffer

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: This paper studies whether refugee law should be centralized, how it should be centralized, and what are the consequences for migrants seeking protection as well as for host countries. Jurisdictions face different refugee in ows. We show that the resulting varying levels of strictness of the eligibility criteria create a legal externality which leads to a "race to the bottom", or a toughening, of asylum standards. They are stricter than the Pareto efficient level. To solve this problem, we consider two forms of harmonization: fixed and minimum standards. We find no proof that either type would lead to a better result for the member countries than national asylum law making. However, the system of minimum standards is clearly best for refugees, and that it is and better than total harmonization for both host countries.

Keywords: competition in law making; asylum law; European law; human rights. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 H11 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking (2010)
Working Paper: Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-31

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