A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value

Guillaume Haeringer

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: It is well known since Owen (Manag. Sci. 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. Two different axiomatic characterizations of this new value are proposed: one including the weights in the axioms and one without.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Related works:
Journal Article: A new weight scheme for the Shapley value (2006)
Working Paper: A new weight scheme for the Shapley value (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:9910

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