A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
Guillaume Haeringer ()
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. Two different axiomatic characterization of this new value are proposed: one including the weights in the axioms and one without.
Keywords: Shapley value; weights; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript - A4; pages: 11 . 11 pages, postscript, prepared from dvips
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Journal Article: A new weight scheme for the Shapley value (2006)
Working Paper: A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9807001
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