Unemployment insurance design and its effects: evidence from the Uruguayan case
Rodrigo Arim () and
Andrés Dean ()
No 12-09, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Instituto de Economia - IECON
Abundant empirical evidence both for developed and developing countries finds that the design of unemployment insurance program may have important consequences on labor market outcomes. In particular, the design of UI system can affect both unemployment duration and employment outcomes. Recent changes in the design of the Uruguayan UI have implied modifications that may alter various labor market outcomes. In particular, we assess the impacts of the following modifications: the duration of UI was reduced from six to four months in the case of temporary laid off workers (suspension); the scheme of payments was changed for permanent laid off workers (job loss). Instead of a lump sum during six months, a decreasing scheme of payments was installed; and the duration of the UI can be extended up to one year for workers 50 or older.
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Impact evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-lab and nep-lam
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Journal Article: Unemployment Insurance Design and Its Effects: Evidence for Uruguay (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-09-12
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