On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

X. Wang () and Yu-Pei Hsu

No 416, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

Keywords: licensing; strategic delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 L10 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pgs.
Date: 2004-12-23, Revised 2004-12-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Published in Economics Bulletin 2004

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Journal Article: On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0416

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