On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

X. Wang () and Yu-Pei Hsu

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 12, issue 6, 1-10

Abstract: This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

Keywords: licensing; strategic; delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09-05
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Working Paper: On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation (2004)
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