Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Raphael Soubeyran

Working Papers MoISA from INRA, UMR Moïsa

Abstract: Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent works answer by the affirmative (Groseclose 1999, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Aragones and Palfrey 2002, 2003). We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods). ...French Abstract : Cet article traite de l'entrée dans une industrie dans laquelle les firmes partagent une réputation collective. Premièrement, nous montrons que l'entrée libre n'est pas socialement optimale, il existe un besoin de régulation à travers l'imposition d'un standard minimum de qualité (par exemple). Deuxièmement, nous montrons qu'un standard minimum de qualité peut inciter des firmes à entrer sur le marché. Contrairement à la pensée commune, un standard minimum de qualité ne doit pas être toujours considéré comme une barrière à l'entrée.

Keywords: CANDIDATE QUALITY; EXTREMISM; PUBLIC GOODS CONSUMPTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position? (2009)
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