A Model for Team Managers with Self-serving Workers

Brice Corgnet

No 08/07, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract: We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers' abilities may facilitate cooperation among agents. This is the case because managers are able to design team contracts based on workers' true performances. Our work provides a motive for the existence of team managers in the absence of asymmetry of information.

Keywords: Teams; Self-serving biases; Behavioral contract theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D82 K12 M12 M14 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2007-08-01
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