The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in a Network

Markus Kinateder

No 08/10, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract: Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoners Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated games history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truthtelling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.

Keywords: Repeated Game; Prisoner's Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Net- (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010-04-16
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http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1271411886_WP_UNAV_08_10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network (2010)
Working Paper: The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:una:unccee:wp0810

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