Peer Evaluations and Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers
No 12/09, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra
We use peer assessments as a tool to allocate joint profits in a real effort team experiment. We find that using this incentive mechanism reduces team performance. More specifically, we show that teams composed of fellows rather than strangers actually underperform in a context of peer evaluations. We conjecture that peer evaluations undermine the inherently high level of intrinsic motivation that characterizes teams composed of friends. We finally analyze the determinants of peer assessments and stress the crucial importance of equality concerns.
Keywords: team incentives; peer evaluations; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 M12 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
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Journal Article: PEER EVALUATIONS AND TEAM PERFORMANCE: WHEN FRIENDS DO WORSE THAN STRANGERS (2012)
Working Paper: Peer Evaluations and Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:una:unccee:wp1209
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