Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games
No 18/09, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other players action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players reaction to it.
Keywords: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Folk Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Journal Article: Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games (2013)
Working Paper: Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:una:unccee:wp1809
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