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Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games

Markus Kinateder

No 18/09, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract: Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other players action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players reaction to it.

Keywords: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Folk Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2009-12-17
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http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1261063683_WP_UNAV_18_09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games (2009) Downloads
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