On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games

Guilherme Carmona

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on the diversity of payoffs is needed in order for such asymptotic result to be valid.

Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games (2004)
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