On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games
Guilherme Carmona ()
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players' payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on the diversity of payoffs is needed in order for such asymptotic result to be valid.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; large games; purification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on win xp; to print on general; pages: 6; figures: 0. none
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Journal Article: On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games (2004)
Working Paper: On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311007
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