Single-basined choice

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

No 30, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.

Date: 2013-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Single-basined choice (2014)
Working Paper: Single-basined choice (2013)
Working Paper: Single-Basined Choice (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013030

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013030

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