Single-basined choice

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, vol. 52, issue C, 162-168

Abstract: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. Single-dipped and single-basined preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting, with the set of all compact convex subsets of Rn as the domain of choice sets. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous. Moreover, we extend our results to larger domains of non-convex sets.

Keywords: Single-basinedness; Choice correspondences; Independence of irrelevant alternatives; The weak axiom of revealed preference; Upper semicontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Single-basined choice (2013)
Working Paper: Single-Basined Choice (2013)
Working Paper: Single-basined choice (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:52:y:2014:i:c:p:162-168

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.010

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