Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once
P. Jean-Jacques Herings () and
Arkadi Predtetchinski ()
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Kutay Cingiz: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE ETBC
Janos Flesch: QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC
No 36, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Perfect information games where each player acts only once (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016036
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