Perfect information games where each player acts only once
Kutay Cingiz (),
János Flesch (),
P. Jean-Jacques Herings and
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Kutay Cingiz: Wageningen University
János Flesch: Maastricht University
Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 69, issue 4, No 3, 965-985
Abstract We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium for any $$\epsilon $$ ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium.
Keywords: Minority games; Subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria; Upper semicontinuous functions; Infinitely many players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once (2016)
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