# Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Kutay Cingiz (), János Flesch (), P. Jean-Jacques Herings () and Arkadi Predtetchinski ()
Kutay Cingiz: Wageningen University
János Flesch: Maastricht University

Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 69, issue 4, No 3, 965-985

Abstract: Abstract We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect $$\epsilon$$ ϵ -equilibrium for any $$\epsilon$$ ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect $$\epsilon$$ ϵ -equilibrium.

Keywords: Minority games; Subgame perfect $$\epsilon$$ ϵ -equilibria; Upper semicontinuous functions; Infinitely many players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once (2016)
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