Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems

Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters and A.J.A. Storcken
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A.J.A. Storcken: Quantitative Economics

No 29, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2000-01-01
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Journal Article: Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2000029

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2000029

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