Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games
Laurence Kranich (),
Andrea Peree and
No 13, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)
This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.
Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2001013
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