Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets

S. Maus, Hans Peters and A.J.A. Storcken
Additional contact information
S. Maus: Quantitative Economics
A.J.A. Storcken: Quantitative Economics

No 29, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2003-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/9804 ... 42ff546-ASSET1.0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2003029

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2003029

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().