The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan and Adolphus Talman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: László Á. Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers

No 18, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2004-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games (2007)
Working Paper: The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games (2007)
Working Paper: The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games (2004)
Working Paper: The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games (2004)
Working Paper: The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2004018

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2004018

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